Jean-Paul RIOPELLE, L'hommage à Rosa Luxemburg, 1992 (détail)[ * ]

Heyd and Newman on the aesthetic appreciation of nature

Allen Carlson

Thomas Heyd and Ira Newman have given careful attention to my position concerning the aesthetic appreciation of nature. I greatly appreciate their efforts. They have also raised a number of interesting questions about that position and, more importantly, have outlined their own alternative points of view on this issue. Since Heyd's and Newman's positions are in themselves interesting and important and since I agree with them in a number of ways, in these remarks I primarily consider these alternative points of view, addressing some of the queries about my own positions only as they arise in the course of the discussion.     

To clearly state Heyd's and Newman's positions concerning the aesthetic appreciation of nature and to fruitfully contrast them with my own, it is helpful to put in place a general schemata for characterizing positions concerning the nature of aesthetic appreciation. In doing so I make two assumptions, one methodological and the other philosophical. The methodological assumption is simply that the various positions I wish to clarify and contrast can be usefully and non-controversially characterized in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for achieving aesthetic appreciation. The philosophical assumption is that common to all such sets of conditions for achieving aesthetic appreciation will be a condition specifying some kind of attention, sensitivity, attitude, taste, or the like. The exact nature of this condition, although of considerable philosophical interest, need not concern us here, for the important differences between my position and those of Heyd and Newman do not depend upon this condition.[1]            

Given these two assumptions, together with the following abbreviations: AK for kind of attention, PK for kind of properties, OK for kind of objects, AA for aesthetic appreciation, and iff (if and only if) for necessary and sufficient for, a basic position type may be characterized as follows:

1. BASIC TYPE: AK to PK iff AA of OK.

This position type specifies both the kind of properties toward which attention must be directed and the kind of objects of which aesthetic appreciation is thus achieved. However, it can be usefully modified by the introduction of the notion of appropriate aesthetic appreciation (AAA) rather than simple aesthetic appreciation, and then weakened such that it indicates only a necessary condition. This gives two additional position types, which I label normative and weak normative:

2. NORMATIVE: AK to PK iff AAA of OK.


The last, the weak normative position type, is that in terms of which I wish to state and contrast the positions under discussion here. However, before doing so, it is necessary to consider some of Heyd's reservations about the notion just introduced, that of appropriate aesthetic appreciation. Heyd comments as follows:

Carlson's proposal that there is such a thing as 'correct' or 'appropriate' aesthetic appreciation should give us...cause to wonder..., for we may ask, correctness and appropriateness according to which standards or to what purpose? Even in the aesthetic appreciation of artworks it remains uncertain what might make the appreciation of a particular piece 'correct' or 'appropriate,' for otherwise there would not be dissension among art critics and art historians. [2]

The answer to Heyd's question is implicit in what has already been said. Given that aesthetic appreciation is tied to particular kinds of objects, as in the basic position type indicated above, it is both possible and useful to introduce a notion such as correct or appropriate aesthetic appreciation, for relevant standards or purposes, which Heyd worries are lacking, are in fact given by the nature of the kind of object of appreciation in question. For example, the nature of music is such that aesthetic appreciation is appropriate only if it involves listening rather than just looking; and the nature of a heavy metal music performance is such that appropriateness require listening mainly to beat rather than to, say, pitch, and perhaps requires a lot of looking (and other activity) as well as listening. [3] Heyd may doubt the relevance of correctness or appropriateness in the appreciation of works of art, but his comment about dissension among art critics and art historians undercuts rather than supports his doubt, for were certain kinds of appreciation of different kinds of works not more correct or appropriate than others, art critics and art historians would have little to have dissension about. As always, if anything goes, there is little to argue about.

I return to Heyd's own account of the aesthetic appreciation of nature below. First, however, I wish to use the position types indicated above to clearly state Newman's point of view. Newman is concerned about my treatment of formalism in the appreciation of nature. He provides an excellent discussion of classic formalism concerning the appreciation of art and then elaborates his own position regarding the appreciation of nature as two different kinds of formalism. [4] In light of the basic position types introduced above, the classic formalism Newman considers may be characterized with reference to formal properties (FP) and art objects (AO) in either a basic or a normative fashion:       



The differences between these two characterizations of formalism are not significant here; what is significant is that both make attention to formal properties both necessary and sufficient. However, a weaker and, in my opinion, more plausible normative formalism involves only necessity:


Weak normative formalism is the kind of view Newman appears to defend in the first part of this essay, although his position concerns natural objects and environments (NO) rather than art objects. He contends that "our active engagement with our natural surroundings has no alternative but to accommodate" as part of a "required" response, the formal properties of "distant panoramas," such as "rhythmical patterns of shapes, color segments and spatial relations."  However, he also notes: "in the spirit of the refined formalism I am proposing, such formal elements comprise only one aspect of our interest." [5] Thus, his position in the first part of his essay may be characterized as follows:


In the second part of his essay, Newman develops another kind of formalist position. He contends that "the human-derived meanings of natural phenomena must be given the recognition they are due" and thus that: dealing with nature appreciation, formalism will be joined with other approaches, including the symbolic, psychological and moral responses to the patterns present in natural phenomena. In fact, we might even call it an iconographic formalism, under whose framework the soaring arcs, shattering waves, radiant sunrises and flowing botanical rhythms can be understood and appreciated for their exemplificative and expressive meanings, and not just their abstract and bare forms.[6]

Newman holds that attention to such expressive properties (EP) is a necessary part of our appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature lest "we disregard who we are as human subjects," but he also cautions that: "Nature is not always...'our creation'; nature merely sometimes is, and only in some ways or aspects." [7] Thus, his position in the second part of his essay may be characterized as follows:


I comment on Newman's formalism below, but first I return to Heyd and clearly state his point of view on the aesthetic appreciation of nature. Heyd develops his position by contrasting it with my own. Thus it is useful to initially clearly state my position. Heyd glosses it as follows:

Carlson justifies the appeal to natural science as the guide to 'correct' or 'appropriate' appreciation of the natural environment, on the basis that this discipline supposedly reveals nature for what it is....The contrast is with appreciation guided by cultural or personal categories.[8]

As Heyd notes, my position involves the idea that natural science reveals the natural properties (NP) that natural objects have and thus that attention to at least some of such properties is necessary for correct or appropriate aesthetic appreciation of natural environments. The view may be called cognitive naturalism and characterized as a position of the weak normative type:


The contrast between cognitive naturalism and Heyd's own position is evident in the above quote in his suggestion that appreciation of the natural environment may be "guided by cultural or personal categories." He makes his point more explicit in the following remark:

It may well be that all sorts of other perspectives, garnered through one's personal intercourse with nature and structured by non-scientific aspects on one's culture may be more  "fruitful" in generating aesthetic pleasure, insight or depth.[9]

Although Heyd refers to "all sorts of other perspectives," it is clear that what figures most prominently in his thinking is the idea that "fruitful" appreciation of nature may be "guided by" attention to the cultural properties (CP) that at least some natural objects have acquired by human "intercourse with nature." [10] I call positions of the kind that Heyd defends cognitive culturalism and, although Heyd's version of it may in fact be weaker than theories of the weak normative type, it may be characterized as such for present purposes: 


Having now clarified Newman's, Heyd's, and my own position concerning the aesthetic appreciation of nature, a number of significant points can be made. The first is that, in light of these formulations of the different points of view, it should be evident that there is no conflict among the various positions. Newman's refined formalism and iconographic formalism, my cognitive naturalism, and Heyd's cognitive culturalism (lines 7, 8, 9, and 10 above) can all be true. Each gives only necessary conditions for the appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature; none claims sufficiency. Indeed part of my motivation in clarifying these positions as I have is to bring out this fact. It is important because much of the apparent plausibility of Newman's and Heyd's criticisms of cognitive naturalism depends upon their presentations of alternative accounts of the aesthetic appreciation of nature. However, once it is clear that these accounts are "alternative" only in the sense of being different in emphasis from cognitive naturalism and not in the sense of being in direct conflict with it, much of the apparent plausibility of these criticisms dissipates.

Nonetheless, it must be noted that both Newman and Heyd do offer criticisms that are to some extent independent of their alternative accounts of the aesthetic appreciation of nature. However, Newman's criticisms, as noted above, are directed mainly against my treatment of formalism and not against cognitive naturalism as such. In fact at points he suggests that cognitive naturalism and iconographic formalism compliment one another. For example:

...what I am proposing is a dual-aspect view toward nature, where...the biological and geological dimensions of natural phenomena (as Carlson and Leopold indicate) are considered essential. [and] At the same time...human-derived meanings of natural phenomena must be given the recognition they are due. [11]

Moreover, concerning his criticisms of my treatment of formalism, his remarks are insightful, suggesting that in so far as my critique is taken as being directed against weak normative versions of formalism such as his (lines 7 and 8 above) rather than only against the application of stronger classical forms of formalism (lines 4 and 5 above) to natural environments, it may be too harsh.

On the other hand, Heyd does present some arguments that are both independent of his cognitive culturalism position and directed squarely at cognitive naturalism. He is particularly worried about the role that natural science plays in cognitive naturalism. For example, he questions the point of "requiring that we see our natural environment through the dicta of natural scientific theory" noting, first, the "incomplete and always provisional character of the 'truths' of science" and, second, the fact "that our natural science itself is part of a culture and not a (visionary?) grasp of the ultimate being of the world." [12]   Concerns of this nature can be addressed as follows: The point of appreciating the natural environment in light of natural science is simply that science, although certainly not a "visionary grasp" of "ultimate being," is yet without doubt the best means we have come up with so far for knowing the "true" nature of the world. Moreover, this is clearly the case even though science is, of course, a part of our culture and its truths are, of course, provisional and incomplete. This said, however, it must also be noted that these matters are not quite as straightforward as this answer suggests. Nonetheless, it is, I think, basically the right kind of response to concerns such as those expressed by Heyd--and enough of a response here, since this general issue is much discussed elsewhere. [13]    

Returning now to the fact that, in light of my clarifications of Newman's and Heyd's positions and of cognitive naturalism, there is no conflict among these theories, four further points can be made:  First, since there is no direct conflict among these theories, the issue is not which is right and which wrong, but rather the extent to which they supplement one another and are each in themselves applicable and plausible accounts of appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature. Second, concerning Newman's and Heyd's positions, in addition to there being no conflict between them, it appears that much of the former is subsumable under the latter. Since expressive properties constitute one kind of cultural property, Newman's iconographic formalism appears to be a species of cognitive culturalism. [14] This means that the applicability and the plausibility of iconographic formalism and cognitive culturalism can be investigated together. Third, since both iconographic formalism and cognitive culturalism, unlike cognitive naturalism, are claimed to hold for only some natural objects, there is a sense in which the applicability and the plausibility of both theories, in contrast to that of cognitive naturalism, can be investigated only on a case by case basis. Fourth, given points two and three, the applicability and the plausibility of cognitive culturalism (and thus iconographic formalism), as opposed to that of cognitive naturalism, may be tested by considering cases of different natural objects and inquiring of each about the extent to which it has cultural properties. In short, Newman's and Heyd's theories provide an applicable and plausible account of the appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature, and thus supplement the account given by cognitive naturalism, to the extent that and only to the extent that a given natural object has acquired cultural properties.

In light of these four points, I conclude by investigating some cases of natural objects and environments that I think demonstrate both the applicability and the plausibility of Newman's and Heyd's accounts of aesthetic appreciation of nature and the extent to which these accounts supplement that given by cognitive naturalism. I consider a spectrum of cases that range from natural objects and environments that clearly have cultural properties, and thus to which and for which these accounts are both applicable and plausible, to other cases concerning which these matters are less obvious. One point of the investigation, in addition to testing the applicability and the plausibility of views of the cognitive culturalism type and thus determining the extent to which such views supplement cognitive naturalism, is to consider the nature and the extent of cultural properties of natural objects and environments. Another point is to suggest that, concerning those natural objects and environments that have few if any cultural properties, cognitive naturalism seemingly remains the most applicable and plausible theory of the aesthetic appreciation of nature.

Case 1: The Human-modified Landscape: The most obvious kinds of natural objects and environments that have acquired cultural properties are those that have been intentionally modified by human physical activity. These kinds of cases in fact constitute most of the environments in which humans live. They range from vast tracts of land, such as the agricultural landscapes of the world, to smaller scale natural objects, such as Mount Rushmore, that have been modified to serve particular human ends. These cases stand at the limits of environments and objects that we might consider natural, but nonetheless clearly lend themselves to the kind of account given by cognitive culturalism. I do not discuss such cases in detail here, as I have done so elsewhere.[15]

Case 2: The Burmis Tree: Similar kinds of cases involve natural objects and environments that have likewise acquired cultural properties due to human physical activity but in less direct and/or in less obvious ways. Here examples range from "natural" sunsets the colours of which are wonderfully enhanced by air pollution to particular objects such as the Burmis Tree. The Burmis Tree is an ancient, gnarled pine standing on a hill side near the town of Burmis and along the route to the Crowsnest Pass in southwestern Alberta. It was a landmark for miners heading for the coal mines of the southern Canadian Rockies at the beginning of the last century and remains so for motorists travelling highway 3 across the pass from Alberta to British Columbia. Today the tree is dead and especially striking when seen in stark silhouette standing tall and dark against the snow covered peaks of the nearby mountains. The cultural properties of the Burmis tree are numerous. For example, one of the local says: "The tree is a symbol for the hardy old-timers who once mined coal from the bellies of the rugged mountains." She likens it to the miners wives who "started out young and soft and pretty" but who with age and hard times became "more beautiful in a sense, but more hardened." [16]   Moreover, such symbolic and expressive properties of the tree are modified and augmented by the fact that its death was due to a local school science class giving it too much fertilizer in 1978 and the fact that its stark tall-standing silhouette is due to its having been propped up and held erect by metal clamps and cables bolted to the rock on which it stands. The tree thus has a complex set of various kinds of cultural properties, knowledge of which is central to it appropriate aesthetic appreciation. Cognitive naturalism alone obviously cannot do justice to such cases; cognitive culturalism is essential.

Case 3: Buffalo Examples: In the previous two kinds of cases, the cultural properties of natural objects and environments are due in part to modifications brought about by human activity, either intentionally and obviously as in the sculpting of Mount Rushmore or inadvertently and subtly as in the killing of the Burmis Tree. In a general sense the properties exist because the object or environment has a particular history that links it with human culture. However, such a history can give a natural object or environment cultural properties even if there is no actual modification involved. In the rolling foothills of southern Alberta there is a rocky cliff that is seemingly as free of human modification as one could ever expect to find: the land remains much as it always was, shaped only by geological and meterological forces, and the prairie shrubs and grasses that cover it are much as they have been for a thousand years. At first glance it seems as if cognitivism naturalism might be all that is applicable, but the place has a history that gives it powerful cultural properties and thus makes cognitive culturalism relevant. The name of the place tells the story: Head Smashed In Buffalo Jump. Its historical, especially archaeological, importance has made it a UNESCO World Heritage Site. The relevance of the historical importance of a landscape to its aesthetic appreciation was, as Newman makes clear, central to the thought of one of the most forceful advocates of cognitive naturalism: Aldo Leopold. [17] However, Leopold recognized the role not only of natural history, but also of cultural history. After noting that "There are those who are willing to be herded in droves through 'scenic' places," he continues:

To such the Kansas plains are tedious. They see the endless corn, but not the heave and the grunt of ox teams breaking the prairie. History, for them, grows on campuses. They look at the low horizon, but the cannot see it, as de Vaca did, under the bellies of the buffalo.[18]

Case 4: Great Bird Examples: Intentional human modification, unintentional human modification, and the human use of natural objects and environments as recorded in their histories all give rise to cultural properties and thus make cognitive culturalism an applicable and plausible account of the appropriate aesthetic appreciation of some of such objects and environments. However, the ways in which natural objects and environments can acquire cultural properties may involve human culture touching them much more lightly than in the cases so far explored. In the northwestern corner of New Mexico the formation known as Ship Rock towers above the arid desert floor. It is a dramatic sight even from miles away on highway 666 where a State of New Mexico "Official Scenic Marker" informs travellers that "This huge volcanic neck was formed in Pliocene times, over 3,000,000 years ago. It rises 1700 feet above the surrounding plain...." Such "scientific" information is essential to Ship Rock's appropriate aesthetic appreciation according to cognitive naturalism. However, the marker continues, even without a sentence break, as follows: "...and is famed in the legends of the Navajo as "Sa-bit-tai-e" (the rock with wings). They believe that it was the great bird that brought them from the north." Seemingly Navajo mythology gives Ship Rock cultural properties such that, in addition to cognitive naturalism, cognitive culturalism is required to fully elucidate its appropriate aesthetic appreciation. [19] Of course, the Navajos are not the only ones with cultural stories about great birds. I have a friend who has a tiny cabin perched high on a mountain side on one of the Gulf Islands between Vancouver Island and the British Columbia mainland. In honour of the great birds he frequently sees soaring high above his pristine escape from the civilization of Vancouver, he dubbed it "Eagle's Nest" and delighted in the expressive meaning that these "noble" and "majestic" birds bestowed on his abode. On visiting him I pointed out that the birds circling his place are actually turkey vultures. Now "Eagle's Nest" has become "Buzzard's Roost" and the true natural and cultural properties of the great birds have united to give it a new expressive meaning. (I have not been invited back.)         

Case 5: Wilderness: Beyond human modification and human use of natural objects and environments and perhaps even beyond human mythology and, as Newman nicely puts it, the human capacity "to construct an environment of meaningful (or iconographic) symbols" lies what we think of as pristine wilderness. [20] Denali National Park and Wildlife Preserve is larger than Massachusetts. Its six million acres straddle the 600 mile long Alaska Range that cuts across the interior of Alaska and is crowned by Mount McKinley, North America's highest peak. It is described as "a true wilderness," "largely wild and unspoiled," and "still little changed" by humanity. [21] And indeed it has the appearance of a true wilderness: the vast landscape is marked by a single gravel road along which visitors travel only in park buses, safari style, viewing caribou, wolf, moose, grizzly bear, and Dall sheep, all so oblivious to human presence that it must be as it was in Eden. Here, it seems, only the account given by cognitive naturalism is applicable and plausible. Yet some cultural properties sneak in even here. It is six million acres, but it is yet a park, a human creation with a human-ordained beginning and human-determined boundaries. Moreover, Denali has a history that intertwines it and its inhabitants with human culture. It was established in 1917 primarily to prevent the slaughter of Dall sheep by meat hunters who were feeding workers on the railroad that was destined to bring gold from the interior fields to the southern port of Seward. Denali's Dall sheep, now so oblivious to human presence, are the descendants of a tiny remnant rescued from the brink of extinction. And present-day human culture also finds niches in the park. When I visited Denali, our safari group spotted a lone moose crossing a pristine mountain stream far out on the trackless taiga. As we aesthetically appreciated this unspoiled natural wonder through our binoculars, someone in the group said, "What's wrong with its neck?," and our guide, who had the strongest glasses, replied, "Oh, that's just a research radio collar." Science is a part of our culture, as Heyd notes, and the way in which it can affect our aesthetic appreciation is not only as science revealing truths about nature, but also as human culture at work in nature.         


In conclusion, given the above range of cases, we might wonder: Are there any truly natural objects and environments left? Any for which cognitive naturalism alone remains the most applicable and plausible theory of their aesthetic appreciation? Here I say only that I hope so--and not simply because it would be good for my theory.

[1] . I discuss this condition in some detail in "Appreciating Art and Appreciating Nature" Landscape, Natural Beauty, and the Arts, eds., S. Kemal and I. Gaskell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) pp. 199-227, reprinted with minor modifications as Chapter 7 of Aesthetics and the Environment: The Appreciation of Nature, Art and Architecture (London: Routledge, 2000).

[2] "Querying Allen Carlson's Aesthetics and the Environment" This Issue (Heyd's MS, page 2).

[3] I develop and defend this kind of position in detail in "Nature, Aesthetic Judgment, and Objectivity" Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 40 (1981) pp. 15-27, reprinted with minor modifications as Chapter 5 of Aesthetics and the Environment: The Appreciation of Nature, Art and Architecture, op. cit.

[4] It is instructive to compare Newman's position and his criticisms of my treatment of formalism with those of Nick Zangwill in his "Formal Natural Beauty" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (2001) pp. pp. 209-24.

[5] "Formalism and Nature: Reflections on Allen Carlson's Aesthetics and the Environment" This Issue (Newman's MS, pages 8-9).

[6] Ibid., (Newman's MS, page 13). Newman's account suggests that what he calls the expressive meanings of natural objects are dependent only or primarily upon the formal properties of such objects (in so far as they have formal properties). However, this need not be the case. The expressive meanings of natural objects may exist independent of any particular formal properties and may by themselves constitute a significant dimension of that which is aesthetically appreciable in nature. Indeed, in my treatment of formal properties and the natural environment, I explicitly contrast formal properties with expressive properties, favouring the latter over the former in our aesthetic appreciation of natural environments. See "Formal Qualities in the Natural Environment" Journal of Aesthetic Education 13 (1979) pp. 99-114, reprinted with minor modifications as Chapter 3 of Aesthetics and the Environment: The Appreciation of Nature, Art and Architecture, op. cit., as well as "On the Possibility of Quantifying Scenic Beauty" Landscape Planning 4 (1977) pp. 131-72.

[7] Op. cit., (Newman's MS, pages 14, 15). The definitive defense of the centrality of expressive properties in our aesthetic appreciation of nature is Mark Sagoff's ground breaking article "On Preserving the Natural Environment" Yale Law Journal 84 (1974) pp. 205-67.

[8] Op. cit., (Heyd's MS, page 2).

[9] Ibid., (Heyd's MS, page 3). Heyd's position and his criticisms of cognitive naturalism are spelled out more fully in "Aesthetic Appreciation and the Many Stories about Nature" British Journal of Aesthetics 41 (2001) pp. 125-37.

[10] That Heyd is primarily interested in the cultural properties of natural objects seems evident from the examples he employs in "Aesthetic Appreciation and the Many Stories about Nature" ibid. However, in so far as he (or Newman) wishes to argue that "personal" properties, whatever such properties might amount to, are necessary for appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature, I think his position is clearly untenable. Descriptions attributing such properties to natural objects fail to meet what I call the "cultural embeddedness" condition in "Landscape and Literature," Chapter 14 of Aesthetics and the Environment: The Appreciation of Nature, Art and Architecture, op. cit.

[11] Op. cit., (Newman's MS, page 13).

[12] Op. cit., (Heyd's MS, page 3).

[13] .The role of scientific knowledge in aesthetic appreciation of nature is much discussed and debated. I have developed and defended my own position in the essays reprinted as Chapters 4-7 in Aesthetics and the Environment: The Appreciation of Nature, Art and Architecture, op. cit., as well as in "Saito on the Correct Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature" Journal of Aesthetic Education 20 (1986) pp. 85-93, "Nature, Aesthetic Appreciation, and Knowledge" Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 53 (1995) pp. 393-400, "Aesthetic Appreciation and the Natural Environment" Aesthetics, eds. S. Feagin and P. Maynard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), and "Environmental Aesthetics" Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, eds., B. Gaut and D. Lopes (London: Routledge, 2001) pp. 423-36. For a range of positions on this issue, both pro and con, see, for example, the following:  Y. Saito, "Is There a Correct Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature?" Journal of Aesthetic Education 18 (1984) pp. 35-46; N. Carroll "On Being Moved By Nature: Between Religion and Natural History" Landscape, Natural Beauty and the Arts, op. cit.; S. Godlovitch, "Icebreakers: Environmentalism and Natural Aesthetics" Journal of Applied Philosophy 11 (1994) pp.15-30; J. Thompson, "Aesthetics and the Value of Nature" Environmental Ethics 17 (1995) pp. 291-305; H. Rolston, "Does Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature Need to be Science Based?" British Journal of Aesthetics 35 (1995) pp. 374-86; M. Budd, "The Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature" British Journal of Aesthetics 36 (1996) pp. 207-22; R. Stecker, "The Correct and the Appropriate in the Appreciation of Nature" British Journal of Aesthetics 37 (1997) pp. 393-402; E. Brady, "Imagination and the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature" Special Issue: Environmental Aesthetics, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56 (1998) eds., A. Berleant and A. Carlson, pp. 139-47; M. Eaton, "Fact and Fiction in the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature" ibid., pp. 149-56; C. Foster, "The Narrative and the Ambient in Environmental Aesthetics" ibid. pp. 127-37; S. Godlovitch, "Valuing Nature and the Autonomy of Natural Aesthetics" British Journal of Aesthetics 38 (1998) pp. 180-97; Y. Saito, "Appreciating Nature on its Own Terms" Environmental Ethics 20 (1998) pp. 135-49; M. Budd, "The Aesthetics of Nature" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2000) pp. 137-57.

[14] The cultural nature of what Newman terms expressive meaning is clear in light of his dependence on Nelson Goodman's analysis of expression. See (Newman's MS, page 14 and endnote # 13).

[15] See "On Appreciating Agricultural Landscapes" Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 43 (1985) pp. 301-12, reprinted with minor modifications as Chapter 12 of Aesthetics and the Environment: The Appreciation of Nature, Art and Architecture, op. cit., as well as "Education for Appreciation: What is the Correct Curriculum for Landscape?" Journal of Aesthetic Education 35 (2001) pp 1-17, and "On Aesthetically Appreciating Human Environments" Philosophy and Geography 4 (2001) pp. 9-24.

[16] Monica Field quoted in Carol Harrington, "Fallen Friend Hoisted Up, Roots Pinned Down by Town" The Edmonton Journal (December 29, 1998) p. A6.

[17] J. B. Callicott has elaborated Leopold's version of cognitive naturalism in a number of related articles. See, for example, "The Land Aesthetic" Companion to a Sand County Almanac: Interpretive and Critical Essays, ed., J. B. Callicott (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987) and/or "The Land Aesthetic" Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence, 2nd Edition, eds., R. G. Botzler and S. J. Armstrong (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1998).

[18] Aldo Leopold, "A Taste for Country" [1953] A Sand County Almanac with Essays on Conservation from Round River (New York: Ballantine, 1966) pp. 179-80.

[19] I defend a version of cognitive culturalism concerning cultural properties dependent on mythological traditions in "Education for Appreciation: What is the Correct Curriculum for Landscape?," op. cit. as well as in "Landscape and Literature," Chapter 14 of Aesthetics and the Environment: The Appreciation of Nature, Art and Architecture, op. cit. In the latter discussion I use Ship Rock as one of my main examples.

[20] Op. cit. (Newman's MS, page 15).

[21] [No author given] Denali: National Park and Preserve (Washington D.C.: National Part Service, U.S. Department of Interior [no date given]) p. 1.

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